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FCC REGULATION OF COMPETITION AMONG
RADIO NETWORKS
I.
THE Federal Communications Commission recently promulgated chain
broadcasting regulations 1 with the purpose of combatting an alleged "mono-
polistic domination" of chain broadcasting by limiting network ownership
of stations and by regulating contractual relations between network com-
panies and their affiliated stations. Action against network "monopoly" has
long been demanded by Congress,2 but the present regulations have evoked
bitter criticism 3 of the Commission from the major portion of the industry.4
The legal and economic patterns of the radio broadcasting industry have
been determined by the physical art,5 and the most important physical limita-
tion has been the scarcity of broadcast channels available for distribution
among entrepreneurs. 6 Though statutes providing for regulation of broad-
casting in the United States have been written in terms of regulating stations,
the stations are only the base of the broadcasting industry. Its superstructure
is the network companies which unite the individual stations into chains.
1. FCC Order of May 2, 1941, Docket No. 5060, as amended by FCC Order of
October 11, 1941, hereafter referred to as the regulations. For the text of the regula-
tions see note 32 infra.
2. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on the Nomination of
Thad H. Brown on Reappointment as Federal Communications Commissioner, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 236, and Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on
S. Res. 113, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 237, 256, 438 (hereafter cited as: Hearings on
S. Res. 113).
3. The controversy over the regulations was described by FCC Chairman Fly as a
"slugging match." Hearings on S. Res. 113, p. 99.
4. The four national networks are owned by three companies; The National
Broadcasting Company owns two, and the. Columbia Broadcasting System and Mutual
Broadcasting System each own one. NBC and Columbia have opposed the regulations,
and Mutual has been in favor of them.
5. See Shulman, Legal Aspects of Radio, 13 ENxcc. oF Soc. SCI. (1930) 66.
6. The portion of the radio spectrum useful for standard broadcasting is the band
between 550 and 1600 kilocycles. To afford interference-free transmission it has been
divided into 106 channels of three types: clear channel, regional channel, and local
channel. Clear channels are for high powered stations. Each regional channel is avail-
able for several medium power stations of different regions. Each local channel is used
by numerous low powered stations. FCC, RADIO, A PUBLIc PRINER (1941) 4-5. The
necessary scarcity of facilities available for Class I stations results in a numerical pre-
ponderance of small stations, but the effective area coverage of Class I stations causes
them to have an earning power and a significance in public policy considerations highly
disproportionate to their numbers. See FCC REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCAsTING (1941)
32 (hereafter cited as: CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT).
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Chain broadcasting, or the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical pro-
gram by two or more connected stations," offers obvious advantages which
make its extensive use inevitable. To advertisers chain broadcasting offers
the opportunity of reaching a national audience and, by increasing the numbers
of listeners of a given program, reducing the program's production cost
per listener. For listeners in all regions chain broadcasting makes available
expensive programs produced only in a few talent centers, such as New York
and Los Angeles. To station owners chain broadcasting offers revenue from
the national market and programs satisfying the statutory obligation to
broadcast in the public interest.
The networks have three major functions: selling network time to national
advertisers, producing programs (commercial and sustaining), and distrib-
uting these programs to affiliates." To carry out these functions the nLtworks
maintain extensive sales forces, operate elaborate studios, lease thousands of
miles of wire-lines, and employ numerous personnel. They also own stations
facilitating network operations.0
A substantial portion of radio advertising is purely local, such as the
programs sponsored by small town retailers, and thus outside the scope 4,f
network operations. Even in national advertising the networks have compu-
tition from national spot programs"' and transcriptions.11 Yet, "the broal-
casting business handled by the three national network organizations, (ex-
cluding the non-network business of the stations owned by them) constitutes
almost half of the total business of all commercial broadcast stations in the
United States,"' and at the end of 1938 network affiliates used 97.9%
of the total night-time broadcasting power of the United States.13
The control of network broadcasting suggested by these figures is not
evenly distributed within the industry. The older network companies, Nationa
Broadcasting Company14 and Columbia Broadcasting System, are substan-
7. CoMrUNI rIONs Acr OF 1934, § 3 (p), 48 STaT. 1065, 47 U. S. C. § 153 (pi
(1934).
S. See CHAIN BROADCkSTING REPoRr 77.
9. The Mutual Broadcasting System, which differs greatly in structure fr,,n NBt
and CBS, owns no stations but is itself owned by stations. See infra p. 451. NBC i,
licensed to operate ten stations and CBS eight. See Cni.%:v Br ittc%,s-fi'- Rrr 32.
10. A national spot program is one in which a national advertiser sponlors thQ
presentation on a local station of some interesting or important local event, for c. ample,
a football game.
11. By using an electrically transcribed, or recordcd, prgram, a national advcr-
tiser may distribute his progran to stations all over the country by mailing them the
discs instead of using wire line conections.
12. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPoRr 3.
13. See id. at 31.
14. NBC is the oldest and most powerful chain broadcasting organization; it ov.ns
two of the four national netvorks. Though there are separate sales forces and program
departments for the two networks, they have not bcen run as searate and distinct units.
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tially more powerful than the Mutual Broadcasting System. It is at the
distribution of power among networks rather than the concentration of
power in networks that the Commission has primarily directed the chain
broadcasting regulations. The Commission seems to recognize that the pre-
eminence of network broadcasting is in the public interest,15 but it takes the
position that there should be competition between the networks, and that
there should be five or six national netvorks instead of four.10 The Com-
mission seeks to achieve these ends by regulating the contractual relation-
ships between the networks and their affiliated stations.
The present standard contract17 between NBC and its affiliates provides
that the network will guarantee the affiliate 200 unit hours", of programs
each contract month. Sustaining programs are supplied free of charge but
the station receives no compensation for the first sixteen unit hours of net-
work commercial programs broadcast through it during the contract month.
For subsequent unit hours of commercial programs the outlet receives a
sliding percentage of its card rate, according to a schedule which provides
for increasing station compensation as the volume of time sales increases.
These affiliation contracts cover a five year period, but NBC is given the
power to terminate'upon a year's notice. The station is forbidden to broad-
cast the programs of other national networks, and though NBC is not ex-
pressly forbidden to send programs to other stations in the affiliate's territory
it usually does not do so. Certain hours of the broadcast day are designated
as network optional time, and the outlet is obliged, upon 28 days notice,
to take network commercial programs offered for these hours. The station
may reject such a program only if its broadcast "would not be in the public
interest, convenience and necessity." According to a report by the majority
of the Commission made after a Committee investigation of network mon-
opoly, these provisions for long term affiliation, exclusivity, and option time,
and their counterparts in the affiliation contracts of the other networks are
the heart of the monopoly problem,'0 and it is at these provisions that the
The Red and Blue are separate networks only in that NBC has duplicate outlet facili-
ties in many cities which are available for the simultaneous network broadcasting of
different programs over substantially the same area. Studio facilities are used intet-
changeably by both networks; volume discounts are based on the customer's use of both
networks; and NBC does not allocate income and expenses between the Red and Blue
networks. NBC affiliation contiacts do not specify with which network the stattou shall
be affiliated, and many stations are used on both. See id. at 44-45.
15. See id. at 4, 77.
16. See testimony of FCC Chairman Fly in Hearings on S. Res. 113, p. 146.
17. For a copy of the standard NBC affiliation contract, see id. at 107-12.
18. The most desirable night-time broadcasting hours count as one unit hour, and
less desirable broadcasting hours count as fractions thereof. Afternoon hours count as
half a unit, and hours between midnight and 8 a.m. count as one-third of a unit,
Id. at 108.
19. See CHA N BROADCASTING REPORT 34.
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first five chain broadcasting regulations20 were directed. One of the remain-
ing regulations 2' was aimed at the ownership of two networks by one
company, and was thus applicable only to NBC.
Although the organization and contractual scheme of the Columnbia Broad-
casting System are fundamentally the same as those of NBC,- the structure
of the Mutual Broadcasting System differs radically from that of the other
two. Mutual is "in form a corporation for profit, but actually a non-profit,
cooperative enterprise."' Its stockholders all are broadcasting organizations.
MAutual stations are either members, participating members, or affiliates. "The
member stations underwrite all operating deficits and wireline charges; and
the participating members contribute in varying degrees toward the expenses
of Mutual and their wire line connections to 'utual's main line." Affiliatci
pay the cost of the wire-line connection from their stations to the Mutual
main line.2-4 MHutual itself owns no studios -5 and, with the exception of
certain news broadcasts, does not produce sustaining programs. The central
organization selects sustaining programs of individual asiociaws and !ends
them out on the wire for the use of the network.
Since February, 1940, M~utual contracts have contained clauses prohibiting
stations licensed to its stockholders from taking programs of other net--orlks,
and some of Mutual's contracts also bind the network not to feed programs
to other stations in the service area of the associated station.20 The contracts
with stockholders run for five year periods, but after two years stations may
cancel by giving a year's notice. With affiliates owning no stock Mutual's
contracts are generally only for one year.
Mutual is much smaller than NBC or CBS. Since its inception in 1934
the number of its associated stations has increased to a present total of ap-
proximately 190,27 but only two of these are clear channel stations, and
about 100 are small local stations. In 1940 time sales of NBC (after dis-
counts; before commissions) totalled $37,118,130, those of CBS $31,181,444,
and those of MHutual $3,600,161.2
S
20. Regulations, §§ 3.101-3.105. See note 32 in!ra.
21. Section 3.107, now indefinitely suspended. See nte 32 in! ra.
22. CBS contracts include rigorous exclusivity clauses prohibiting outlets frtvm taL-
ing the programs of other networks and also forbidding the network to give prOgrani
to other stations in the service area of its outlet. CBS's typical contract, like NBC' ,
binds the station for five years at the option of the network, aid also contains pruvii,,ir
for option time. See Hearings on S. Rcs. 113, pp. 112-14; CHA:z B ,.xCASU: RL-
PoRT 35-42.
23. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1941, p. 32, col. 8; see also Hearings on S. Rcs. 113.
p. 156.
24. CEnx BRoADCASTING REPorT 28.
25. But see N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1941, p. 32, col. 8.
26. See Hearings on S. Res. 113, pp. 84-85, 164.
27. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1941, p. 32, col. 8.
28. See CHAIN BaO.CASTIxNG REPoRT 41, 42, 28.
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Both Mutual and the Commission contend 20 that the long term affiliation
contracts made by NBC and CBS, coupled with exclusivity and option time
practices, deprive Mutual of an opportunity to rise to a position of equal
strength, and that Mutual is especially handicapped by its inability to secure
satisfactory outlets in many important cities where there are only two or
three stations, all either owned by NBC or CBS, or under restrictive con-
tracts with them.
NBC and CBS maintain that their predominance is due to early entrance
i.nto a speculative field, that the practices complained of are necessary for
the conduct of stable and responsible network systems, and that the Com-
mission is without jurisdiction to issue or enforce the chain broadcasting
regulations.30
II.
The Communications Act of 193431 does not expressly delegate to the
Commission the power to regulate networks; enforcement of the chain broad-
casting regulations3 2 thus depends upon the Commission's control over in-
29. See Brief, and Supplemental Brief for Mutual Broadcasting System before
the FCC in Matter of the Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcaslitin, Monopoly
in the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters.
30. See Brief and Supplemental Brief for National Broadcasting Company before
the FCC in Matter of the Investigatio of Chain or Network Broadcasling, Monoply
in the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters (hereafter cited as NBC Biu:ni., and
NBC SUPPLEmENTAL BRaEr).
31. 48 STAT. 1064-1105, 47 U. S. C. §§ 151-55, 201-21, 301-29, 401-16, 501-05, 601-0)
(1934) (hereafter cited as: COMMUNicATIONs AcT OF 1934).
32. The regulations, as amended, are:
3.101. No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any
contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organiza-
tion under which the station is prevented or hindered from, or penalized for, broadcast-
ing the programs of any other network organization.
3.102. No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any con.
tract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a network organization
which prevents or hinders another station serving substantially the same area from
broadcasting the network's programs not taken by the former station, or which prevent,
or hinders another station serving a substantially different area from broadcasting any
program of the network organization. This regulation shall not be construed to prohibit
any contract, arrangement, or understanding between a station and a network organilza.
tion pursuant to which the station is granted the first call in its primary service area
upon the programs of the network organization.
3.103. No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any
contract, arrangement, or understanding express or implied, with a network organization
which provides, by original term, provisions for renewal, or otherwise for the affiliation
of the station with the network organization for a period longer than two years: Pro-
vided, That a contract, arrangement, or understanding for a period up to two years, may
be entered into within 120 days prior to the commencement of such period.
3.104. No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station which options
for network programs any time subject to call on less than 56 days' notice, or more tine
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dividual stations. The regulations merely state that no license shall be granted
to stations having contracts with networks which engage in the specified
disfavored practices.
The Commission contends that the regulations come within the grant of
power in Section 303(i) to make special regulations applicable to stations
engaged in chain broadcasting, or, alternatively and collaterally, are justifiable
under Section 303(f) as regulations appropriate to carrying out the pro-
visions of Section 307(a) and (d) which govern the issuance and renewal
of licenses in the public interest.
than a total of three hours within each of four segment- of the br-adcast day, a, herein
described. The broadcast day is divided into 4 segments, as followvs: 8 a. mn. to 1 p. in.;
1 p. m. to 6 p. in.; 6 p. in. to 11 p. in.; 11 p. in. to 8 a. m. Such optiuns may not lVe
exclusive as against other network organizations and may not prevent or hinder the sta-
tion from optioning or selling any or all of the time covered by the cption, or other
time, to other network organizations.
3.105. No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any
contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a nctwvork: organiza-
tion which (a), with respect to programs offered pursuant to an affiliatio n contract,
prevents or hinders the station from rejecting or refusing network programs :hich the
station reasonably believes to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable; or which (b), with re-
spect to network programs so offered or already contracted for, prevents the station
from rejecting or refusing any program which, in its opinion, is contrary to the public
interest, or from substituting a program of outstanding local or national importance.
3.106. No license shall be granted to a netw ork organization, or to any p2rcon
directly of' indirectly controlled by or under common control vith a network organiza-
tion, for more than one standard broadcast station where one of the stations covers su0-
stantially the service area of the other station, or for any standard broadcast station in
any locality where the existing standard broadcast stations are so few or of such unequal
desirability (in terms of coverage, powver, frequency, or other related matters) that com-
petition would be substantially restrained by such licensing.
3.107. No license shall be issued to a standard broadcast station affiliated with a
network organization which maintains more than one network: Provided, That this
regulation shall not be applicable if such networks are not operated simultaneously, or
if there is no substantial overlap in the territory served by the group of stations c,,m-
prising each such network.
3.108. No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station having any
contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, with a nt-tworkz organiza-
tion under which the station is prevented or hindered from, or penalizcd for, fixing or
altering its rates for the sale of broadcast time for other than the networh's proi-samc.
IT is FuRTia oavERaE, That these regulations shall become effective immediately:
Provided, That, with respect to existing contracts, arrangements or unterstanding- oir
network organization station licenses, the effective date ,hall be deferrd until Nuveni-
her 15, 1941; Provided further, That the effective date of Regulation 3.10. with respect
to any station may be extended from time to time in order to enrmit the orderly di-
position of properties; and Prorided further, That the effecti e date of Regulation 3.107
shall be suspended indefinitely and any further order of the Commnision I-lacing -aid
Regulation 3.107 in effect shall provide for not less than six montis' n.tice and for fur-
ther e-:tension to the effective date from time to time in order to lItrmit the ,ril,'rly
disposition of properties.
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Though Section 303(i) is written in broad terms, a persuasive argument
can be made that the power granted is limited to technical regulations. This
provision first appeared in a part of the Radio Law of 192734 devoted to
technical matters, and at the time of its enactment Congress probably be-
lieved it desirable to have special technical regulations for chain stations. 05
There were current misapprehensions as to the possibility of synchronizing
stations. Technicians generally thought that stations of a network might
all operate on a common frequency without interference. Suggestions were
made that, to prevent duplication of programs within a receiving area, it
might be desirable to limit the power output of stations while broadcasting
chain programs. If the drafters of the Act intended to give the Commission
power to make regulations broader in scope than the technical regulation
of chain program broadcasting it would probably have been more convenient
to give the Commission power over the network organization as such, rather
than to confine the authority to regulating stations engaged in chain broad-
casting.
Even without recourse to Section 303(i), however, the Commission may
be empowered to issue the regulations by Section 307(a) and (d) and
Section 303(f). The standard of public interest, convenience and necessity
governing the Commission's action on license applications is to be inter-
preted, said the Supreme Court, "by its context, by the nature of radio
transmission and reception, by the scope, character, and quality of services."0 0,
This context test was applied by the Supreme Court in FCC v: Sanders
Brothers Radio Station,87 in which a station owner sought to enjoin the
granting of a new license which he claimed would create such competition
that his station could not continue to operate profitably. The Court said:
"An important element of public interest and convenience affecting the issue
of a license is the ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service
to the community reached by his broadcasts. That such ability may be assured
the Act contemplates inquiry by the Commission, inter alia, into an appli-
cant's financial qualifications to operate the proposed station." Though the
remarks of the Court in the Sanders case referred to a refusal to issue a
license permitting destructive competition, they would seem to apply as well
to the converse situation, where the applicant for a broadcast channel will
use the channel in such a way as to diminish competition to the detriment
of program service. In both cases the controlling consideration is the effect
33. But see 68 CONG. REc. 2881 (1926) ; 81 CONG. REC. 2336 (1937).
34. 44 STAT. 1162 (1927) (hereafter referred to as: RADIO ACT oF 1927).
35. See Hearings before Committee om Interstate Commerce on S. 1 and S. 1754,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) 212 et seq. See also testimony of Senator White in Hear-
ings on S. Res. 113, p. 146.
36. Fed. Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933).
37. 309 U. S. 470, 475 (1940).
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upon the broadcast service rendered to listeners, rather than merely upon
the competitors.3 s
The Commission's power to consider competition is fortified by the
presence of a strong anti-monopoly policy in Title III of the Communicatirn,
Act. The provision 39 that no person shall own any property right in radio
channels, reinforced by the requirement 40 that waiver of any claim to tlhe
use of a radio frequency shall be a precondition to the issuance of a license.
and the provision 4 ' limiting the term of license for broadcasting to thre
years, were designed to prevent the domination of the air by ownership #r
vested interest groups.- Furthermore, Section 313 expressly makes the
anti-trust laws applicable to "the manufacture and sale of and to trade in
radio apparatus and devices entering into or affecting" interstate or foreign
commerce or radio communications; and a court, upcon finding a licensee
guilty of a violation of the anti-trust laws, is authorized to revoke its licenses
as an additional penalty.
43
It may be contended that inasmuch as the issue of radio monopoly is
determinable in the courts the Commission is without jurisdiction to make
its own findings upon the question a basis for the denial of license applica-
tions. But refusal of a license by the Commission under the chain broad- 0
casting regulations is not predicated upon violation of the anti-trust laws,
but rather upon the theory that granting the application would limit compe-
tition and thus adversely affect program service.44
If the Commission may consider competition in issuing licenses, may it
also promulgate prior regulations defining the practices which it will con-
sider against the public interest and, therefore, grounds for refusing renewal
38. Other non-technical matters affecting the quality of program ervice which
have been held to justify the Commission's denial of a license applicativ'n are: oimcr-
ship of the proposed station by another station, Great Western Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc.
v. FCC, 94 F. (2d) 244 (App. D. C. 1937); the prtposed station's lack of finanoal
ability, Goss v. Federal Radio Comm., 67 F. (2d) 507 (App. D. C. 1931); and previous
broadcast of objectionable matter by the applicant for a license renev.-al, Trinity Mcth_-
dist Church South v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 F. (2d) 850 (App. D. C. 19321 ; K1I4B
Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm., 47 Fed. (2d) 670 (App. D. C. 1931).
39. Co rnucATxrioNs Acr oF 1934. §§ 301. 309(h) (I1).
40. See id. § 304.
41. See id. §307(d).
42. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137 (1940).
43. Section 311 directs the Commission to refuse any application for a license nde
by persons having had previous licenses revoked by a court finding them guilty of such
radio monopoly. Section 311 also authorizes the Commission to revoke the license of a
person so found guilty, even though the court does n6t imp, se this additik'nal penalty.
44. Conversely, the statutory mandate that the Commission shall refuse applica-
tions of convicted monopolists having had licenses revoked by a court is not dependent
upon an evaluation of the broadcast service rendered Iy the applicant, or cif the effect sf
granting the license upon the public interest. Section 311 applies to all liccnisees found
guilty of restraint of trade in radio apparatus and devices, v.whether or n,'t they have
ever engaged in monopolistic broadcasting practices.
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applications? The standards of public convenience, interest and necessity
defining the scope of the power to act upon license applications, are the
same criteria, under the statute, which apply to the issuance of regulations.
Furthermore, the regulation-making power should be employed to carry
out the other provisions of the act and, therefore, may be presumed to extend
as far as the Commission's other powers.
Moreover, the validity of the Commission's chain broadcasting regulations
need not depend upon the rule-making power conferred in Section 303(f),
but may rest upon Section 307 alone. It is clear that the so-called chain
broadcasting regulations are not regulations within the sense of Section 502,
in that they are not enforceable commands or prohibitions, violation of which
is judicially punishable. They are, rather, an announcement of the policy
the Commission intends to follow in the exercise of its discretion upon future
license applications. 46 Such declarations of policy are approved administra-
tive practice. 47 They disclose the grounds of Commission decisions, aid
consistency of Commission action, and furnish a basis for prediction and
compliance. The courts have recommended such declarations of policy to
the Commission.4s It seems clear, therefore, that the regulations are within
the Commission's power and that they will be sustained unless found by
the courts to be unreasonable and arbitrary.
ni.
Of the eight chain broadcasting regulations, one is designed to give
licensees increased control over program matter, one to encourage compe-
tition between stations and their affiliated networks, and one to make avail-
able to other stations in each area network programs which have been re-
jected by the network's regular affiliate. Two of the regulations are designed
to combat dominance of individual network companies by limiting network
ownership and control of stations, and by limiting to one the number of
networks which may be owned by a single company. And three are designed
to increase competition between networks by limiting the term of affiliation
contracts, forbidding stations to promise that they will take programs from
one network only, and forbidding exclusive option time. The two provisions
which seek directly to equalize the power of networks and make possible
increased inter-network competition, are closely related to the affiliation term,
station exclusivity, and option time regulations. These five regulations are
45. COMMUmCATIONS AcT o 1934, §§ 303, 307(a).
46. The Commission so regards them; see CHAIn BROADCASTINa Ri'oltr 85. But
see Complaint in NBC v. United States, Civil Action No. 16-178, paragraph 27, District
Court for the Southern District of New York (1941).
47. See SEN. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 27.
48. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F. (2d) 288, 290-91 (App. D. C. 1938);
Heitmeyer v. FCC, 95 F. (2d) 91, 98 (App. D. C. 1937).
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the most important, but whether they will cause any substantial change in
the pattern of the broadcasting industry is an open question.
Section 3.107, which seeks to terminate ownership of two networks by
one company, has been indefinitely suspended, because a forced sale would
occasion undesirable loss. The Commission believes, however, that "separate
ownership . . . is so generally recognized to be desirable that . . . a
separation will soon occur without the spur of a legal mandate." 4 9 It is
good Commission strategy to avoid a court test of the reasonableness of
this section, since separate ownership of the two networks will probably be
attained without it if the other regulations are upheld. Section 3.106 will
force NBC to sell its interest in at least four stations which are located in
cities where it owns or controls two stations, and it will probably choose
to sell the Blue Network stations in those cities rather than the Red.-" In
all likelihood the Blue stations will be sold in a group, as part of a whole
network sale, in order to maintain the sale value of both stations and net-
work. 1
The theory of Section 3.106 is that network ownership of a station,
especially in a region where outlets are scarce, gives the owning network
an unfair advantage in competing for advertising with other networks not
.having access to satisfactory outlets.5- The regulation is also based upon
the belief that concentrated control5 3 of radio is undesirable, and on the fear
that the networks may sacrifice the interest of their affiliated stations for
the stations which they own.54
The five year term of affiliation contracts, sought to be shortened by
Section 3.103, limited competition between networks for stations, and also
served to make the rise of new networks exceedingly difficult.m Because the
49. FCC SUPPLEMENTAL RF.PORT oz CHAxN BRo.ADCASTING (manifold copy) 14.
50. The greatest part of NBC's profitable advertising business has been done by
the Red Network, and if only one network must be sold there is little doubt but that
NBC will choose to sell the Blue. Disposal of network-controlled stations would weaken
the network, and if stations must be sold in these four cities the less profitable Blue
Network would be sacrificed. Sale of Blue Network affiliates in these four cities would
also be preferable because the Blue stations are less desirable than the Red. NBC's Red
station in Chicago, WMAQ, is authorized to broadcast full time, while the Blue station,
VENR, has only part time authorization. In San Francisco the Red station, KPO, has
a strength of 50 KXNV, and the Blue Station only 71- KW. In Washington, D. C., the
Red Station, WRC, is owned by NBC, and the Blue Station, WMAL, is operated
under lease by NBC.
51. Even the dissenting commissioners agreed that one network ought to be sold.
See dissenting opinion of Commissioners Case and Craven, FCC SuPPLEmiENrTAL RPonRT
ox CHAra BgOAncsTixG (manifold copy) 2.
52. See CAIrN BROADCASTING REPORT 63.
53. Though network owned or operated stations are comparatively few in number,
they include a large proportion of the important Class I stations. Hearings on S. Res.
113, p. 19.
54. See CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT 67-68.
55. See id. at 59-63.
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termination points of the affiliation contracts of the various stations were
staggered over a five year period, any new network would have to choose
its outlets from the less desirable residue of unaffiliated stations, or begin
operations with one or two stations while waiting for the termination of
contracts to afford opportunity for piecemeal increase in station affiliations.
The long term contract emphasized the restrictiveness of the exclusivity
clauses, now sought to be eliminated by Section 3.101, and the option time
provisions, now limited by Section 3.104; and in every case they minimized
network competition from national spot programs. For optimum sales results,
the programs of an advertising series must be given on the same station,
at the same day and hour every week for several successive months. Thus,
the normal time for which advertisers contract is thirteen weeks. But optioned
time must be given up to the network upon 28 days notice, and local, national
spot, and non-option-holding networks, which broadcast a program on time
subject to option, could be sure of only four successive weeks before being
required to change their hour. Option time, however, is not merely a device
to restrict competition, but is also a convenient solution of an otherwise
complicated network traffic problem. The sale of network time requires
simultaneous availability of all the stations of the desired network groups,
and when a network has a program for a chain of 50 or 75 stations, each
of which sells time for local and for national spot programs, it is often diffi-
cult to find an hour in which every station is open. As the advertising value
of one hour differs from that of another,50 the traffic difficulty also hampers
network sales efforts, since definite time offers cannot be made to the pros-
pective customer. The exclusive option-time practice solved this problem
by compelling every affiliate to take network commercial programs upon
28 days notice.- All local programs, national spot programs, and programs
of other networks, where there was no exclusivity provision, had to be
scheduled subject to clearance for the affiliated network. This limited the
option-holding netwvork's traffic problem to clearing against its own programs
and scheduling programs 28 days in advance.
The original regulations prohibited option time completely, but they have
since been modified. 57 As now written, Section 3.104 is a compromise
between the convenience of option time as a device to protect the availability
of whole networks against the intrusion of local programs and the unde-
sirability of option time as a device to block inter-network competition. The
day is divided into four segments, the three most important having five hours
56. The evening hours between 8 and 11 are considered the most valuable, and
Sunday afternoons are more valuable than other afternoons. See JOINT COMMITEE ON
RADIo RESEARCH, STUDY OF RURAL RADIO OWNERSHIP AND USE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1939) 20-22, and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, URBAN RADIO LISTENING
IN THE UNI OED STATES (1941) 8-27.
57. See note 32 .supra.
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each. In each segment three specified hours may be placed under so-called
"non-exclusive network option," exercisable at no less than 56 days notice.
A "non-exclusive option" may be given to one or more networks, but may
not prohibit the station from selling or optioning the same time to other
networks. Thus, the option-holding network or networks now get clearance
of the optioned hours against local or national spot programs, but not against
other networks. Local and national spot programs are assured of at least
two hours in each segment from which they may no longer be ousted by
networks. Even if they select an hour subject to option, under the lengthened
notice requirement they have it for at least eight weeks of continuous broad-
casting before they may be required to change.
The Commission minority, NBC, and CBS believe that the abolition of
these contractual bonds will make it impossible for stable networks to exist,
and that the regulations will create excessive commercialism and opportunism
in netvork broadcasting. s They argue that at present networks spend large
sums for sustaining programs which they furnish to their outlets; but when
stations are not exclusively affiliated with one network the sustaining service
will benefit the other networks which use the station as much as the supply-
ing network. Furthermore, an opportunistic network, by lowering sustaining
expenses, can offer advertisers and stations better terms than can networks
under the present mode of operation. They could obtain another competitive
advantage at the public's expense by eliminating certain rural affiliates which
advertisers do not desire to use, but which they use at present because
networks offer stations in groups which must be taken as a whole.m Thus,
competition between networks might deprive commercially unprofitable rural
areas of national network service. Hence, the argument runs, the regula-
tions will cause the network business to degenerate into an irresponsible
time brokerage, and advertising companies will dispense with networks en-
tirely and arrange their own inter-station hook-ups6 0 Control of broad-
casting will be transferred from stable companies with a long-run interest
in the industry to numerous out-of-the-hat operators.
The Commission majority, on the other hand, believes the regulations vill
cause no such radical reformation of the industry. They point out that it
will not be practical for advertising companies to set up their own hook-ups,
because they will probably not be able to gain access to key stations owned
by the networks, and because they do not have leased wire line facilities to
affect the hook-up. 61
58. See CHAiN BROADCASTING REPORT 115-39; dissenting opinion of Commissioners
Case and Craven, op. cit. supra note 51. See also testimony of Niles Trammell and IV.
S. Paley in Hearings on S. Res. 113.
59. See Hearings on S. Res. 113, p. 165.
60. See NBC Brief, Point III; Hcarings on S. Res. 113, pp. 503-13.
61. See id. at 62, 63, 85.
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At present national advertisers pay the networks the card rates of the
stations used, without added fee for wireline relays. The networks lease
lines from the telephone companies at a cost of about $8 per month per
airline mile. The geographical pattern of the network, together with the
large number of network stations, tends to minimize the ratio of line mileage
to stations connected. While the telephone companies also have a price
schedule for hourly connections, the hourly charge is 20 cents per airline
mile, at which rate two and one-half 16 hour broadcasting days would cost
as much as leasing a line for a whole month.02 The telephone companiel
also require considerable advance notice for deviational hookups and often
cannot arrange them for lack of facilities. Even assuming hookups could
be secured for a one hour network, the advertiser would be limited in his
choice of time to the unoptioned portion of each segment, unless he wished
to risk being ousted by network option. Finding an hour in the unoptioned
portion of the segment which none of the desired stations has already sold
will be very difficult, because of concentration there of local advertising
purchases.
IV.
Though any prediction is conjectural, it is not likely that the regulations
promulgated by the Commission will radically change the pattern of the
radio industry. The two hours of unoptioned time in each segment will aid
local and national spot advertisers and may cause an increase in the use
of transcriptions for simultaneous multiple point broadcasting. But networks
are not forbidden to contract for non-optioned time,03 and non-network users
will still have to compete against them, even in the option-free portion of
each segment.
In metropolitan areas adequately served by four or more stations, it seems
likely that even without contractual shackles each station will tend to affiliate
with one network from which it will take all its network programs0 4 Custom,
inertia, and business convenience indicate this result. The greatest change
will probably occur in about twenty metropolitan areas which have three
or fewer adequate outlets for the four networks. In the past Mutual has
been unable to secure outlets in many of these regions and has, therefore,
been unable to compete for certain national programs whose sponsors in-
62. The telephone companies offer several different qualities of transmission ser-
vice. The prices here quoted are for Schedule's A and B, which are the same grade of
service. Schedule A is for the monthly contract period with continuous use 16 hours a
day, and Schedule B is for occasional use on an hourly contract period. Service on Sched-
ules A and B permits transmission of 100-5000 frequencies, and is the grade of service
usually used by networks. See FCC Accounting, Statistical and Tariff Dep't, Pro-
gram Transmission Channel Rates (effective July 10, 1941).
63. Section 3.103. See SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING (manifold
copy) 8-9.
64. See testimony of L. G. Caldwell, Hearings on S. Res. 113, p. 160.
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sisted on covering them.e5 Under the regulations Mutual cannot be barred
by exclusive affiliation clauses, and it will not have to contract for time
subject to the option power of rival networks.Y
Station promiscuity in two-outlet and three-outlet regions may dictate a
change in the system of indirect charge for sustaining service now employed
by NBC and CBS. As Mutual grows, it too will probably have to furnish
sustaining programs. Competition among networks to place commercial pro-
grams on the stations of two-outlet and three-outlet regions may cause those
stations to broadcast a disproportionately small number of "public service"
sustaining programs, but the likelihood of decreased program quality this
suggests will be mitigated by the increased ability of these stations to choose
among commercial programs.
As previously suggested,67 the regulations will also probably induce NBC
to sell its Blue Network, leaving four separately owned networks. Elimina-
tion of exclusive affiliation and exclusive option time might eventually result
in the establishment of a fifth network,"s though this possibility is minimized
by the limited number of available outlets. Increase in the number of
national network companies is the most significant change that the regulations
will bring about.
Whether five network companies will give better service than three is a
question the answer to which involves the interrelation of many variables,
including the following: the number of stations suitable for major network
affliationship; the amount of advertising revenue available for netvorks;
the effect of the increase in the number of networks upon wire-line cost;
and the effect of the increase upon the diversity of programs available to
listeners at any given time. Some of these considerations are similar to those
governing the determination of the optimum allocation of resources for public
utilities. But the Commission has not attempted to justify the regulations
by such a factual analysis. It advances in favor of the regulations only the
general arguments that competition is desirable, and that the regulations will
also protect free speech.
The Commission argues that by increasing station control over program
content and by increasing the number of network companies the regulations
will protect freedom of the air and insure fair presentation of controversial
public issues.69 This argument seems to be based upon the generalization
65. See p. 452 supra.
66. See NBC SuPPim wrAL BRIE 52: "The real controversy in this proceeding
is between National, on behalf of its Blue Network and Iutual."
67. See p. 457 supra.
68. See Hearings on S. Res. 113, p. 146.
69. See testimony of Chairman Fly in Hcarings on S. Res. 113, p. 151: "But the
possibility of increased competition is only one of the results of our regulations. Even
more significant is their impact upon the power to decide what goes out over the air.
By requiring a divestiture of the red network from the blue, our regulations eliminate
1942]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that decentralized control safeguards freedom. But the networks have shown
no alarming disposition to dictate policy through their control of radio
channels. Indeed, they are very conscious of their vulnerable position as an
industry affected with the public interest. Business acumen has led them
to adopt a policy of antiseptic news presentation" and to remain irreproach-
ably aloof from partisanship in public issues. Though there have been com-
plaints that access to the air cannot be had by minorities, these complaints
are mostly directed against individual stations and not against the net-
works.
7 1
Even if it were true that decentralized control better protects free speech,
the present regulations promise no great safeguard. There is little proba-
bility that the social and economic prejudices of four or five network com-
panies will be significantly different from those of three network companies.
And it is unlikely that the power given to stations to reject network pro-
grams will often be used in the interest of free speech or impartial presenta-
tion of public issues.
The other policy behind the Commission's desire for four networks is
the encouragement of competition. The Commission, however, asserts no
desire to open the network business to free competition in the full sense of
the term, although NBC and CBS predict the regulations will have that
effect. A prerequisite for such free competition would be the abolition of
the present practice of leasing broadcast transmission wire line facilities,
and the installation of additional facilities which could hook up any desired
group of stations and could keep changing the grouping at the end of every
half hour broadcasting period. Through its common carrier control over
the telephone companies the Commission might be able to secure the instal-
lation of facilities to permit such kaleidoscopic shifts in hookup patterns,
and probably could require the networks to charge for hookups at a specified
the control of N.B.C. over two Nation-wide networks, an unhealthy concentration in
one single management group over access to listeners of the country. By decentralizing
the power to decide what the public may or may not hear and by returning that power
to the hundreds of station licensees all over the country, our regulations insure that the
channels of information so vital to the preservation of democracy will remain open and
unrestricted."
70. See, for example, CBS's memorandum on European war coverage, reprinted in
Hcarings on S. Res. 113, p. 362 et seq.
71. See KASSNER AND ZACHARoFF, RADIO IS CENsoRED (1936). "N.B.C. with its
program series 'The Town Meeting of the Air' has made a notable contribution to pub-
lic and uncensored discussion. Columbia presented a series of discussions on the subject
of control of radio with such speakers as Anning Prall, William Green and Norman
Thomas. Minority points of view are receiving more attention from the program de-
partments of the networks and hence cries of censorship grow less frequent. However,
most of the smaller stations and the larger independents remain shockingly narrow in
their program approach." Id. at 7.- See also FROsT, Is AMSIUCAN RADIO DE.ocltrxc?
(1937) 74-84.
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hourly rate applicable to all users.72 Under those conditions the removal
of contractual barriers might permit free competition.
The most striking result of such free competition would be the separation
of the three network functions.73 Already the telephone companies perform
the actual task of transmitting programs from the point of origin to the
broadcasting stations, and with transmission facilities equally available to
everybody there would no longer be an advantage in common performance
of the functions of selling time and supplying sustaining programs. Under
those conditions there would be free competitive opportunity to sell station
time on a commission basis and to produce suitable sustaining programs
for sale to stations. Such a freely competitive organization 74 of the industry
would be radically different from that obtaining at present, and there would
be no place in it for the present type of network company.
The Commission, however, has indicated no interest in establishing free
competition through changing the transmission facilities practices; indeed,
it has expressly accepted the postulate that networks of the present type
ought to remain an integral part of the broadcasting system.7 5 In ackmowl-
edging this, the Commission is subscribing to limited competition, and thus
cannot consistently justify the regulations merely with reference to the
general desirability of competition.
70
Competition between networks as a force to regulate program quality
seems singularly inapplicable to the peculiar structure of American broad-
casting. Networks compete with each other for advertisers, stations and
listeners.77  Competition for listeners seems relatively unimportant because
72. Com-iUNcANIo s AcT oF 1934, §§202(b), 215(b), 204, 205(a); Hcarings an
S. Res. 113, p. 134.
73. See p. 449 supra.
74. For the disadvantages of such a system see p. 459 supra.
75. See CHMAN BROADCASTiNG REPORT 8S.
76. See id. at 47-49, 56. Besides arguing in general terms that competition will
improve broadcasting service, the Commission seems to argue that, regardless of the
effect on broadcasting service, the maintenance of competition is a duty of the Com-
mission. "In the absence of Congressional action exempting the industry from the anti-
trust laws, we are not at liberty to condone practices which tend to monopoly . . ." Id.
at 46. But this inclusion of competition within the purview of the standard of public
convenience, interest, and necessity would seem to be stretching the standard's mean-
ing. See p. 455 supra. Certain provisions of the regulations, however, are directed
against specific forms of restrictive waste. Station exclusivity, prohibited by Section
3.101, occasionally prevented stations from broadcasting outstanding programs of net-
works other than its affiliated network. A frequently cited e.xMmple was the inability of
NBC and CBS affiliates to broadcast certain World Series baseball games. See Hear-
ings on S. Res. 113, pp. 173-75, 393-95. Section 3.102 will occasionally prevent listeners
of a given region from losing a desirable network sustaining program. Under Section
3.102, when the network's regular affiliate has obtained a commercial program for that
hour, the network will be able to give the program to another station in the service area.
77. Probably the most important competition for listeners is that between adver-
tisers, or, more specifically, between the advertising companies which produce programs
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program preferences will exert much more influence than station or net-
work preferences in attracting listeners during any half hour 1 8 The number
of listeners an advertiser can reach is, therefore, limited by the effective
service area of the network he employs, but the number of listeners within
a given service area is determined by the attractiveness of the program which
he himself produces. Hence, network popularity will not be an important
factor when advertisers choose between networks, and the increased compe-
tition betwen networks will make itself felt primarily in price competition.
The economic desideratum of competitive price, however, is not relevant
here3 9 The cost of radio programs is not a matter of public concern, except
insofar as it affects the quality of program service available to listeners,
and is not the problem toward which the Commission has directed the
regulations. Insofar as "monopolistic" networks are in a better position than
competing networks to limit the time consumed by advertising announce-
ments and to regulate the nature of advertising announcements, network
"monopolies" would seem to be desirable. Despite its unique property pat-
terns, the broadcasting industry is a public utility" which, if it is to remain
privately owned and operated for profit, will serve the public best when
regulated in accordance with positive policy. Probably this affirmative policy
should be at least outlined by a new Congressional statute,8 1 having as some
of the aims of its positive regulatory policy :82 (a) securing network service
for commercially unprofitable regions, (b) raising the level of listener taste
rather than catering to "average" taste, (c) scheduling the programs of
different networks so that they supplement, rather than duplicate, each other,
(d) minimizing advertising and raising its ethical and aesthetic quality.
It seems likely that these objectives can be attained most effectively through
Commission control over networks. But they require regulations specifically
directed to particular goals, rather than general faith in the power of con-
for the large advertisers. Each advertiser is, of course, vitally interested in attracting
as large an audience as possible, and, irrespective of competition between networks, this
interest insures competitive effort to make commercial programs satisfy popular taste.
78. A listener's choice of programs at any particular time is dependent upon several
interrelated factors. The clearness with which his set receives different stations is very
important. Between several stations that give good reception it is likely that the lis-
tener will choose the one that at the moment is broadcasting the program most suited to
his tastes. Many listeners have a preference for network stations, and some for local
stations. But choice of stations on the basis of affiliation with a particular network is
probably negligible. See FCC REPORT ON SOCIAL AND EcoNomIc DATA (1937) 75-82,
103-04; RosE, NATIONAL POLICY FOR RADIO BROADCASTINa (1940) 132-33.
79. The listener does not directly bear the cost of producing radio programs.
80. See Ross, NATIONAL POLICY FOR RADIO BROADCASTING (1940) 11-14.
81. Two bills have been recently introduced to amend the Communications Act of
1934 in regard to its radio provisions: S. 1806, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), and I-I. R.
5497, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). Neither provides for additional regulatory power.
82. See RosE, NATIONAL POLICY FOR RADIO BROADCASTING (1940) 273 ct seq.
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